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This is a dispute between neighbors, the Hollands and the Harrisons. The 
issues on appeal concern the Hollands’ easement by prescription to use a road to 
access their parcel. The road crosses the Harrisons’ parcel, and it is that portion 
of the road where the Hollands’ easement is located that is in dispute on appeal.  
Under Utah law, one is entitled to a prescriptive easement where the use of 
another’s land was open, continuous, and adverse under a claim of right for 20 
years. See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998). The trial court 
resolved on summary judgment the issue of whether the Hollands satisfied these 
elements, but reserved for the jury the issue of the easement’s scope. The jury 
found that the easement is 40 feet wide. 
The Harrisons challenge the summary judgment ruling on the ground that 
the Hollands’ use was neither continuous nor adverse. And the Harrisons contest 
the jury’s finding based on a jury instruction and two evidentiary rulings. 
As to the requirement that use be continuous, the Harrisons assert that a 
conversation in June 2016 interrupted the Hollands’ use. The Harrisons did not 
raise this argument in opposing the motion for summary judgment. Regardless, 
the majority rule is that a landowner’s oral objection does not interrupt a 
claimant’s adverse use. The court did not err, even if the issue were preserved.  
As to the requirement that the use be adverse, the Harrisons assert that a 
prior owner of their parcel, Janice, gave permission to the prior owner of the 
Hollands’ parcel, Torres, to use the road for the limited purpose of marketing the 
 2 
Torres parcel. But that permission ended when the marketing ended—i.e., when 
Torres sold the parcel to the Hollands. The Hollands had no permission to use 
the road once they purchased the parcel, and, even if the prior permission 
included the Hollands, they never used the road for marketing their parcel.   
As to the challenged jury instruction, the Harrisons assert, for the first time 
on appeal, that the court erred in instructing the jury to determine the easement’s 
scope by finding a width that is “reasonably necessary” for the Hollands to 
continue their historic use of the road. The issue is not preserved, and jury 
instruction is not erroneous, let alone prejudicial. The scope of an easement is set 
by past use. The Harrisons assert only that no Utah case has used this precise 
language. This assertion is irrelevant because the particular wording is not 
dispositive. And the assertion is incorrect because that language is found in Judd 
v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56, ¶ 58, 397 P.3d 686. 
As to the two evidentiary issues, the Harrisons assert that the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing the testimony of the Hollands’ expert and 
excluding the testimony of the Harrisons’ expert. But the court properly allowed 
the testimony of the Hollands’ expert because he provided an accurate survey of 
the road and drew no legal conclusions for the jury. And the court properly 
excluded the testimony of the Harrisons’ expert because his proffered testimony 
was cumulative and not rebuttal testimony.  
This court should affirm.   
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Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the Hollands’ use of 
the road where it crosses the Harrisons’ parcel was adverse and uninterrupted.   
Standard of Review: A summary judgment ruling is reviewed for 
correctness, viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600. 
Preservation: To the extent the Harrisons challenge the ruling that the 
Hollands’ use was uninterrupted during the 20-year period based upon a June 
2016 discussion, the issue is not preserved. The Harrisons did not present this 
argument to the court in opposing the motion for summary judgment. The 
Harrisons first presented this argument in a motion to reconsider. [R.564-76,646.] 
And the Harrisons have not challenged the trial court’s refusal to reconsider. 
[Op. Br. at 7-8.] Even if they had, the trial court’s decision not to address the 
merits of the motion to reconsider is afforded considerable discretion. Tschaggeny 
v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ¶ 15, 163 P.3d 615.  
The Harrisons did preserve their argument that the Hollands’ use was not 
adverse. [R.278-79,523,1372.]  
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury to determine 
the scope of the easement by reference to the width that is “reasonably 
necessary” for the Hollands to continue their historic use of the road. 
Standard of Review: This court will review challenges to jury instructions 
for correctness. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ¶ 14, 29 P.3d 638. “If a party does not 
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object and articulate the grounds with sufficient specificity such that the issue is 
presented before the trial court for consideration, that issue cannot be raised on 
appeal.” R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ¶ 10, 40 P.3d 1119.  
Preservation: The Harrisons claim they preserved this issue by submitting 
a jury instruction. [Op. Br. at 8,47; R.930.] But when the court held a colloquy 
with the attorneys concerning the instruction crafted by the court, the Harrisons’ 
counsel reported that he was “[l]argely happy” with the instruction and asked 
only that the court add one additional line. [R.1749.] The Harrisons’ counsel did 
not argue that the instruction was an improper statement of law without the 
additional line and did not ask the court to strike anything, including the 
“reasonably necessary” language challenged on appeal. [R.1749-51.] 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 
testimony from the Hollands’ expert (Mr. Blake).  
Issue 4: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
testimony from the Harrisons’ expert (Mr. Bunker).  
Standard of Review for Issues 3 and 4: “The trial court has wide 
discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.” State v. Larsen, 
865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). This court will not reverse for an abuse of 
discretion “unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.” Id. 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Statement of Facts 
The Hollands have used a road that cuts across the Harrisons’ adjoining 
parcel since the Hollands purchased their parcel on August 9, 1996. [R.197-98, 
533,1509,1527; Add.B.] That day, they crossed the Harrisons’ parcel, pulling a 
four-horse trailer, and set up camp on their parcel. [R.197,226,1370,1527.]  
When the Hollands acquired their parcel, the Harrisons’ parcel was owned 
by Janice,1 who owned all the land in the basin prior to her subdividing the 
property. [R.309.] While Janice still owned the Harrisons’ parcel, Janice sold what 
would later become the Hollands’ parcel to Torres. [R.50,310.]  
Janice gave Torres his parcel, and in exchange Torres built a cabin for 
Janice on one of her other parcels. [R.310,1652.] Torres arranged to have the road 
cut to take prospective buyers to his parcel. [R.310.] Torres did this without 
Janice’s knowledge. [R.310.] Although Janice did not authorize the road in 
advance, she subsequently gave Torres temporary permission to use the road for 
the limited purpose of marketing his parcel to prospective buyers. [R.310-11.]  
Importantly, Janice did not give Torres permission to use the road for 
permanent residential access. [R.310-11.] Instead, Janice’s permission to Torres 
was temporary and for a limited purpose. [R.310-11.] It was her intention at all 
                                              
1 In the record, Janice is known both as “Janice Hawley,” at the time she 
subdivided the property, and later by “Janice Kirk Gustafson,” including in her 
declaration for this litigation. [R.309; Add.C.] 
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times that the roads on the plat map (not the road at issue) were to be used for 
permanent access. [R.310.] 
Torres sold his parcel to the Hollands about six months after he acquired 
it. [R.1509-10.] The road was in place and had been used. [R.198,209,368.] The 
road was a single lane, like other roads in the subdivision, but the Hollands 
could drive it without any trouble. [R.363,368.] The road looked about the same 
as it does in current pictures of the road. [R.198.] The road shown in post-2013 
satellite images was “the road that has existed since [the Hollands] first went to 
the property” on August 9, 1996. [R.1530.] The road was penciled onto the map 
of the subdivision that the Hollands saw prior to purchasing their parcel. [R.195.]  
The Hollands did not discuss their right to use the road with Janice, but 
Mr. Holland understood from talking to Torres when they purchased that they 
were paying more for the parcel than surrounding parcels because of the road 
Torres had cut and the power pole he had put in. [R.197-98.] 
Janice did not give the Hollands permission to use the road on what would 
become the Harrisons’ parcel, but she was aware that the Hollands bought their 
parcel and were using the road to access their parcel. [R.197-98,310-11.]  
As the Hollands developed their parcel, they had cement and dump trucks 
travel the road. [R.1559.] In addition, the Hollands maintained the road on what 
would become the Harrisons’ parcel—e.g., by moving rocks, smoothing the road, 
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adding gravel, and adding water berms to allow for drainage and thereby 
decrease erosion. [R.200,1535-36,1558-60.] 
In October of 1997, the Hollands transferred the title for their parcel to 
their family limited partnership, SPAH Family Ltd. [R.406-07,1510.] 
In 2008, Janice sold to the Harrisons their parcel. [R.11,62.] The Harrisons 
built a spur off the road to their cabin, and Mr. Harrison widened the turning 
point to allow for clearance when turning the corner to the spur. [R.1530-31,1607-
08.] The Hollands testified that Mr. Harrison widened the turning point for the 
spur to his cabin, but that he had done little to the rest of the road. [R.1530-
31,1536-37.] In contrast, Mr. Harrison estimated that the road was 9- to 12-feet 
wide when he purchased the parcel, and he testified that the width of the road 
was now “upwards of 30 feet wide.” [R.1607-08.]  
In addition to using the road on the Harrisons’ parcel, the Harrisons used 
the portion of the road extending across the Hollands’ parcel, which is consistent 
with an express easement designated on the plat map. [R.522.] The Hollands 
placed decorative gates across the road crossing their property. [R.1550-51.] 
Mr. Harrison was unhappy with the gates because he disliked getting out to 
open them. [R.1554.] After Mr. Holland gave Mr. Harrison permission to unbolt 
one of the gates to get some trucks through, he found the gate cut into pieces on 
the side of the road, and Mr. Harrison refused to put it back up. [R.1552-53,1560, 
1613-16.] Mr. Harrison pushed another gate with his car. [R.1555,1557,1612.] 
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In June 2016, Mr. Holland and Mr. Harrison had a verbal disagreement 
concerning the road. [R.211,586.] In his deposition, Mr. Holland testified that this 
discussion was about the road across the Hollands’ parcel, which is not the 
easement at issue in this appeal. [R.211.] He testified Mr. Harrison had 
threatened to widen the road on the Hollands’ parcel and tear down the 
Hollands’ pump shed in the process. [R.211.]  
On September 13, 2016, Mr. Harrison parked a bulldozer to block the 
Hollands from using the road to reach their parcel. [R.138,1358.] Ms. Holland 
contacted police about Mr. Harrison blocking the road, and then filed the police 
statement that mentioned the discussion in June 2016. [R.586,1540.]  She said: 
“Charlie Harrison and Stan Holland (my husband) argued about rights to an 
access road in Willow Basin. Deputy Black called out – talked to both parties.” 
[R.586.] The police did not intervene or take any action. [Op. Br. at 23.] 
2. Procedural History 
On September 15, 2016, the Harrisons filed this lawsuit, seeking to have 
title quieted to the express easement across the road on the Hollands’ parcel—the 
easement that is not at issue on appeal. [R.1-5,11,13.] The Harrisons sued the 
Hollands for trespass based on the Hollands’ use of the road where it cut across 
the Harrisons’ property. [R.14-15.]  
The Hollands counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title to a prescriptive 
easement over the portion of the road on the Harrisons’ parcel, which they had 
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been openly using for permanent residential access without interruption for 
more than 20 years.2 [R.19-21,23,30.] 
The Harrisons filed a motion for summary judgment. [R.173-84,223-245.] 
The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Harrisons, 
ruling that the Harrisons had a 40-foot nonexclusive access easement over the 
Hollands’ parcel. [R.521-23.] That ruling is not at issue on appeal.  
The Hollands also moved for summary judgment with respect to their use 
of the road over the Harrisons’ parcel. The court ruled that the Hollands had 
established a prescriptive easement by showing open, continuous, and adverse 
use of the road for more than 20 years. [R.523,1365-66,1372.] The trial court 
reserved the scope of the Hollands’ prescriptive easement for trial. [R.523.] 
The Harrisons filed a motion to reconsider, asserting for the first time that 
Ms. Holland’s police statement referring to a discussion in June 2016 was 
evidence that the Harrisons had interrupted the Hollands’ use of the road before 
the end of the 20 years. [R.564-76.] The court refused to reconsider. [R.646.] 
Before trial, the parties submitted proposed instructions and objections. 
[R.896-943,1011-16,1017-22,1041-43.] But the instruction at issue on appeal 
(Instruction No. 27) was crafted by the court. [R.1011-1016,1749.] During a 
colloquy between the court and counsel, the Harrisons’ counsel reported that he 
                                              
2 The Hollands also sought compensation for the gates Mr. Harrison had 
damaged. [R.31.] The Harrisons do not challenge on appeal the jury’s award of 
damages for the gates. [R.1096; Op. Br. at 7-9.]  
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was “[l]argely happy” with Instruction No. 27. [R.1749.] He asked to have a line 
added, but did not ask the court to strike any language (including the 
“reasonably necessary” language at issue on appeal); nor did he argue that any 
language from the instruction was unsupported by Utah case law. [R.1749-51.]  
At trial, the jury heard testimony from various witnesses concerning the 
road. The realtor who sold the parcel to the Hollands testified that the road 
provided access to the Hollands’ parcel by looping through the Harrisons’ parcel 
because of “outcropping of rock or something that they couldn’t get through” 
otherwise. [R.1653.] He also testified that the road was cut in the mid-1990s using 
a dozer blade that was eight feet wide. [R.1653,1659.] He testified that to cut the 
road, the driver had to use the bulldozer the length of the road multiple times, 
“[p]robably several times up and back.” [R.1659.] He testified that the road’s 
being cut with an eight-foot blade did not make a road eight feet wide, because 
“[i]t can take several cuts to put a road in.” [R.1660.] 
Prior to the Hollands’ visiting the parcel, a utility pole was placed there. 
An employee from Rocky Mountain Power testified that the pole had a tag 
indicating placement in 1995. [R.1585,1590-91.] He testified that in 1995 the 
power company would have used the same equipment as now to install power 
poles. [R.1595-96.] He testified that “the two pieces of equipment that are 
absolutely necessary in order to install a power pole” are a “derrick digger,” 
used to auger a hole and set the pole in the ground, and a “bucket truck,” used to 
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raise the lineman to reach the lines. [R1592-93.] Derrick diggers weigh over 
26,000 pounds, are “50-plus foot long” and typically have six wheels. [R.1593.] 
Bucket trucks are similarly large pieces of equipment, but vary somewhat in size, 
with those at the small end, called squirt booms, weighing under 26,000 pounds, 
but still over 10,000 pounds. [R.1594-95.] A helicopter would not have been used 
in place of the trucks to place the pole because of the terrain. [R.1597.] 
Before trial, the court denied the Harrisons’ motion in limine seeking to 
exclude testimony from the Hollands’ expert, Mr. Blake. [R.839.] The court ruled, 
“It is plain that the purpose of the survey is to provide the court with the legal 
description of a pathway on the ground in the event that the evidence establishes 
that there is a legal right of way along that pathway.” [R.839.] “If [the Hollands] 
establish the existence of a right of way, it will then be very useful to the court to 
have a metes and bounds description of that right of way so that a judgment can 
be entered which reduces the likelihood of future litigation.” [R.839.] 
At trial, Mr. Blake testified concerning his survey of the road in 2016. 
[R.1581.] Mr. Blake testified about how he surveyed the road, including 
estimating its edges, mapping points along the road, generating a legal 
description, and working backward to estimate the centerline of the road. 
[R.1576-79.] He acknowledged that he had not consulted historical photographs 
and that he did not “have any information at all” on the road in 1996. [R.1584.] 
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The trial court did not permit testimony from the Harrisons’ expert, 
Mr. Bunker. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 1-2.] Mr. Bunker did not plan to present a 
competing survey or other evidence. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 1.] The expert designation 
indicated that the Mr. Bunker would testify as to “the procedure for determining 
the location of a prescriptive easement” (rather than the procedure for surveying 
a road). [R.664.] The Harrisons’ counsel proffered that the expert would repeat 
undisputed facts from the testimony of Mr. Blake (the Hollands’ expert) 
including that Mr. Blake did not consult historical photographs in conducting his 
survey. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 2-3.] The trial court ruled that the Harrisons’ expert 
would not be permitted to testify because his intended testimony “usurped the 
Court’s responsibility in instructing the jury.” [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 2.] 
3. Disposition Below 
The jury awarded the Hollands a 40-foot easement. [R.1094-95.] The 
Harrisons appeal. [R.1299.]  
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Summary of the Argument 
The Harrisons first assert that the trial court erred in ruling on summary 
judgment that the Hollands established uninterrupted adverse use of the road 
for a 20-year period. But the undisputed facts establish uninterrupted adverse 
use from August 9, 1996, to August 9, 2016.  
The Harrisons claim the Hollands’ use was interrupted by a discussion in 
June 2016, but they did not present this argument in opposing summary 
judgment. They presented this argument only in a motion to reconsider, the 
denial of which they have not challenged on appeal.  
Even if they had challenged that ruling, the court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to reconsider. In addition, the Harrisons’ argument 
concerning the June 2016 discussion fails on its merits. The majority rule is that a 
landowner’s filing a lawsuit or physical interference with a claimant’s use of the 
land interrupts the adverse use, but an oral objection does not. Consistent with 
this, Utah appellate courts have never held that oral objections, even those 
clearly evincing an intent to end acquiescence, interrupt adverse use. The cases 
cited by the Harrisons do not say otherwise, as they deal with physical barriers. 
If this court reaches the merits, it should affirm.    
The Harrisons next challenge the summary judgment ruling on the ground 
that the Hollands’ use was not adverse because Janice (the prior owner of the 
Harrisons’ parcel) gave permission to Torres (the prior owner of the Hollands’ 
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parcel) to use the road for marketing his parcel. But Janice’s permission and the 
permitted use ended when the Hollands acquired title. From that day forward, 
the Hollands’ use of the road was adverse.   
The Harrisons also challenge the jury determination of the easement’s 
scope. The Harrisons first assert that the trial court improperly instructed the 
jury to find that the scope of the easement is the width “reasonably necessary” 
for the Hollands to continue their historic use of the road. This objection was not 
preserved. Regardless, the language is nearly identical to language set forth in 
Judd v. Bowen, which quotes prior cases. 2017 UT App 56, ¶ 58, , 397 P.3d 686. 
Even if the argument had been preserved, the instruction was not erroneous, and 
the Harrisons have demonstrated no prejudice.   
Finally, the Harrisons challenge two evidentiary rulings. The Harrisons 
assert that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony of the 
Hollands’ expert and excluding the testimony of the Harrisons’ expert. But the 
court properly allowed the testimony of the Hollands’ expert because he 
provided an accurate survey of the road and drew no legal conclusions for the 
jury. And the court properly excluded the testimony of the Harrisons’ expert 
because his proffered testimony was cumulative and not rebuttal testimony.  




1. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that the Hollands’ Adverse Use of the 
Road Satisfied the 20-Year Prescriptive Period  
The Hollands’ use of the road was both adverse and uninterrupted for 
more than 20 years. Under Utah law, “[a] party claiming a prescriptive easement 
must prove that his use of another’s land was open, continuous, and adverse 
under a claim of right for a period of twenty years.” Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998). The Hollands began using the road, without 
permission, when they acquired title on August 9, 1996, and continued to use the 
road through August 9, 2016. [R.196-98,202-03,208,211.] A month later, in 
September 2016, the Harrisons filed a lawsuit and blocked the road, but it was 
too late. [R.1-5,138,202-03.] 
1.1 The court correctly ruled that the Harrisons did not interrupt the 
20-year period  
The Harrisons argue that they interrupted the 20-year period with a verbal 
discussion in June 2016. [Op. Br. at 34-35.] The argument fails for a number of 
reasons, some procedural and some on the merits.   
1.1.1 The Harrisons do not appeal from the order denying the 
motion to reconsider, the order addressing their argument 
on appeal   
The Harrisons argue that a discussion between the parties in June 2016 
interrupted the 20-year period before it ended. The argument is not properly 
before the court, and in any event, the Harrisons are incorrect on the merits. 
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This court should decline to consider the argument. In opposing summary 
judgment, the Harrisons did not raise the June 2016 discussion or argue that it 
interrupted the prescriptive period. Instead, they raised this argument for the 
first time in their motion to reconsider. [R.564-76.] The trial court refused to 
reconsider. [R.646.] On appeal, the Harrisons have not challenged the trial court’s 
refusal to reconsider, and therefore have not challenged the applicable order 
concerning the June 2016 discussion. [R.646; Op. Br. at 7-8, 33-35.]  
Because they have not appealed from the order on the motion for 
reconsideration, the Harrisons have not addressed the applicable standard of 
review or demonstrated an abuse of discretion. [Op. Br. at 7-8.] Trial courts have 
discretion to refuse to reconsider, except “(1) when there has been an intervening 
change of authority; (2) when new evidence has become available; or (3) when 
the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would 
work a manifest injustice.” McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2013 UT 20, ¶ 24, 299 P.3d 1139 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Absent these limited circumstances, the 
court’s ruling will not be overturned unless “there is no reasonable basis for the 
decision.” Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ¶ 16, 163 P.3d 615 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
The Harrisons did not argue below or in the opening brief that the trial 
court was required to reconsider its summary judgment ruling. To the contrary, 
the Harrisons informed the court that it had discretion to consider their motion, 
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but was not required to do so. [R.607.] The Harrisons initially sought to persuade 
the court to exercise its discretion in their favor by asserting that they had not 
received the sheriff’s report containing Ms. Holland’s statement until after the 
summary judgment ruling. [R.566,569.] But when the Hollands pointed out that 
the June 2016 discussion was not newly discovered evidence, the Harrisons 
conceded that “before the summary judgment motion was argued” they were 
aware of the “June 2016 face-off” and that law enforcement was summoned. 
[R.606.] The Harrisons stated that “[w]hether or not the sheriff’s report is ‘new 
evidence’ . . . misses the point,” because rule 54(b) “permits a court to revisit and 
revise any interim order before final judgment” and “that right is entirely 
discretionary with the court.” [R.607 (emphasis added).] The Harrisons do not 
challenge on appeal the trial court’s refusal to reconsider. [Op. Br. at 7-8; R.1299.].  
The operative order denying the motion to reconsider is therefore not 
before this court, and even if it were, it would be reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. McLaughlin, 2013 UT 20, ¶ 22; Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37, ¶ 16. The 
Harrisons have not argued the court abused its discretion by refusing to 
reconsider. This court should decline to consider the argument.    
1.1.2 The Harrisons have not demonstrated that the trial court 
applied the wrong legal standard 
Even if the June 2016 discussion had been properly raised, the Harrisons 
have demonstrated no error. In discussing whether an oral objection could 
interrupt adverse use, the trial court was correct in saying that “forbidding the 
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use has no legal affect at all.”3 [R.1372.] To the contrary, as the court noted, 
objecting to the use is what makes the use adverse, and therefore, “forbidding 
them [would] start the period running if it hadn’t already started.” [R.1366.]  
The trial court’s ruling is in accord with a majority of jurisdictions. And the 
majority rule comports with Utah case law and the doctrine of prescriptive 
easement. Under the majority rule, a landowner must file a lawsuit or physically 
interfere with the adverse use. Indeed, most jurisdictions require “actual physical 
interference with the claimant’s use,” “in such a way as to prevent, at least 
temporarily, the adverse use.” Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of 
Easements & Licenses in Land, § 5:16 (2019). [Add.E.] “It is not sufficient merely to 
attempt an interruption or to render the use less convenient. The obstruction 
must in fact interfere with the claimant’s usage.” Id. (footnotes omitted).  
The Harrisons acknowledge “[t]he weight of authority is . . . that mere 
remonstrances or protests by the landowner will not prevent the acquisition of a 
                                              
3 In the summary judgment proceedings, Mr. Harrison asserted in his 
affidavit that he had notified the Hollands, “well before August 1 of 2016, that 
we forbad Defendants’ use of the roadway,” but he provided no specifics. 
[R.304,1365.] To overcome summary judgment, an affidavit “must set forth 
specific facts that would be admissible in evidence.” Smith v. Four Corners Mental 
Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ¶ 50, 70 P.3d 904 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
A “bare assertion[]” is “insufficient to create an issue of fact.” Anderton v. Boren, 
2017 UT App 232, ¶ 28, 414 P.3d 508. On appeal, the Harrisons have not argued 
that the trial court’s ruling was wrong in light of Mr. Harrison’s bare assertion 
that he “forbade” the use. [Op. Br. at 16.] Issues “not presented in the opening 
brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court.” 
Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 903 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
any event, for the reasons set forth in this section, the trial court was correct in 
ruling that Mr. Harrison’s forbidding the use had no legal effect. [R.1366,1372.] 
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right by prescription, in the absence of any physical interference with the user, or 
legal proceedings based thereon.” [Op. Br. at 39 (quoting 4 Tiffany on Real 
Property (2017 ed.), § 1206).] This rule makes sense, as a landowner’s objection or 
“complaints may strengthen the conclusion that the claimant’s use was hostile.” 
The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land, § 5:16.  
This court has previously treated a claimant’s persistent use in the face of a 
landowner’s opposition as evidence of adverse use, not interruption. This court 
upheld a determination that a grazing association’s use of a road was adverse “in 
view of the association president’s insistence during the 1950’s that they had a 
right to use the trail and would force their way through if necessary and in view 
of the testimony that the association riders in fact forced their way through the 
fence or gate when they did not have a key during the period from 1950 to 1980.” 
Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Utah 1984).  
Although Crane did not directly address the question before this court, it is 
consistent with the majority rule that actual interruption is necessary to interrupt 
adverse use. The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land, § 5:16. It also supports that a 
landowner’s ineffective opposition, such as oral objections, is evidence of 
adverseness rather than interruption. Id. 
This approach makes sense in light of the doctrine of prescriptive 
easement. A claimant’s use is either under the landowner (permissive) or against 
the landowner (adverse). Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 537 (1953). If the use is by 
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permission, the landowner may generally revoke the license at any time. 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.16 (2000). But where the use is 
adverse, further objections only reinforce the fact that the use is adverse. 
The majority rule makes sense and is not called into question by any of the 
four cases cited by the Harrisons. The issue ruled on in the four cases was not 
whether an oral objection interrupts the prescriptive period, but whether 
ineffective physical barriers interrupt the prescriptive period. In each case, the 
courts determined that the landowner’s conduct, which included repeatedly 
erecting physical barriers, was sufficient to interrupt the period even if the 
claimant circumvented the barriers. Allen v. Thomas, 209 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2006); Pittman v. Lowther, 610 S.E.2d 479, 481-82 (S.C. 2005); Kelley v. 
Westover, 938 S.W.2d 235, 235-37 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997); Rice v. Miller, 238 N.W.2d 
609, 611 (Minn. 1976).  
None of the Harrisons’ cases hold that a single oral objection interrupts the 
prescriptive period. Nor do they express relevant policy considerations. The 
Harrisons argue that this court should avoid a “law of the range mentality” 
urging “self-help remedies” that “compel[] landowners to engage in potentially-
violent confrontations, as a prerequisite to the defense of property rights.” [Op. 
Br. at 38.] The Harrisons quote one of their cases as being in favor of a rule that 
“will serve to discourage the type of violent confrontations that could result from 
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forcing a property owner to ‘successfully’ defend his right to keep others off of 
his land.” [Op. Br. at 37 (quoting Allen, 209 S.W.3d at 481).]  
But in that case, that court was not suggesting that a rule requiring the 
landowner to erect a physical barrier or initiate a lawsuit could result in violent 
confrontations; the court was suggesting that requiring landowners to do more 
than erecting physical barriers—perhaps defend the barriers—could lead to 
violent confrontations. Allen, 209 S.W.3d at 481; see also Pittman, 610 S.E.2d at 481. 
An oral objection is not sufficient to interrupt a prescriptive period. 
Instead, it confirms that the use is adverse. Even if the argument concerning 
interruption were preserved, this court should affirm.   
1.1.3 The record does not indicate that the Harrisons took overt 
action clearly evincing an intent to end their acquiescence 
Even if this court were to reach the issue and adopt the rule urged by the 
Harrisons that an oral objection “clearly evincing an intent to end . . . 
acquiescence” should be deemed to interrupt a claimant’s use [Op. Br. at 38], the 
record does not indicate that the Harrisons made such an objection. 
The Harrisons base their argument on Ms. Holland’s police statement, 
which said: “Charlie Harrison and Stan Holland (my husband) argued about 
rights to an access road in Willow Basin. Deputy Black called out – talked to both 
parties.” [R.586.] The only evidence this provides concerning the Harrisons’ 
conduct is that Mr. Harrison “argued” about “an access road.” [R.586.] 
 22 
In their briefing, the Harrisons state that “the Harrisons . . . summoned law 
enforcement to prevent Hollands’ use of the road” and that “[b]ased on Page 
Holland’s account in the Sheriff’s Report, it is clear that in June 2016 . . . Charlie 
Harrison and Stan Holland had a confrontation on the property in which 
Mr. Harrison challenged Mr. Holland’s use of the road.” [Op. Br. at 23, 34.] But 
Ms. Holland did not state that the Harrisons summoned law enforcement to 
prevent the Hollands’ use of the road; she did not identify who summoned law 
enforcement or the road about which the parties argued. [R.586.]  
Without any support, the Harrisons assert that “the Harrisons timely 
challenged the Hollands’ continued trespass onto the Harrison parcel for any 
purpose by notifying Hollands that Harrisons did not acquiescence in that use 
and calling the Grand County Sheriff’s office to remedy the situation.” [Op. Br. at 
57.] The Harrisons suggest that based on Ms. Holland’s police statement, “As of 
June 2016, there could be no doubt that the Harrisons did not acquiescence in the 
Hollands’ continued use of the Harrisons’ property.” [Op. Br. at 39.] But 
Ms. Holland’s police statement that the parties “argued” about an access road 
does not support the Hollands’ characterization, and the Harrisons do not point 
to any other record support. [R.586.]  
Mr. Harrison was a party to the June 2016 discussion. But Mr. Harrison 
provided no account of that conversation. Mr. Holland testified about the June 
2016 discussion in his deposition, explaining that the discussion was about 
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Mr. Harrison’s threatening to knock down the Hollands’ pump house in order to 
widen the road on the Hollands’ parcel to the full 40 feet designated on the plat 
map. [R.751.] In other words, the discussion was about the Harrisons’ express 
easement over the Hollands’ parcel; it was not about the easement at issue on 
appeal—the Hollands’ easement over the Harrisons’ parcel. [R.598,751.]   
Ms. Holland’s secondhand police statement does not contradict 
Mr. Holland’s deposition testimony or create a disputed issue of fact. She 
testified that the two men argued about “an access road in Willow Basin” and 
“Deputy Black called out—talked to both parties.” [R.586.] Thus, the trial court 
was presented with undisputed testimony from the Hollands that the discussion 
in June 2016 was about the road on the Hollands’ parcel, not on the Harrisons’ 
parcel.  
This court has three ways to affirm. This court should not address whether 
the June 2016 discussion interrupted the prescriptive period because the issue is 
not properly before the court. If the court does address it, the court should adopt 
the majority rule that supports the Hollands’ position that verbal discussions do 
not interrupt the period. And if the court does not adopt the majority rule, the 
court should hold that the record does not support a verbal interruption here.  
1.2 The Hollands’ use of the road was adverse 
The Harrisons also argue that the Hollands’ use of the road was not 
adverse based on a temporary limited permission that Janice (the prior owner of 
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the Harrisons’ parcel) gave to Torres (the prior owner of the Hollands’ parcel) 
[Op. Br. at 43; R.310-11.] This argument, while preserved, also fails.  
Regardless of whether Torres’ use was permissive, the undisputed 
evidence demonstrates that the Hollands’ use was adverse from the day they 
acquired title because their use was inconsistent with the permission granted by 
Janice to Torres. Where a landowner has given license for the property’s use, and 
the licensee’s use is consistent with that license, the use will not be presumed to 
be adverse. Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 537–38 (Utah 1953). But adverse use 
can be demonstrated by showing a use that is inconsistent with the license. Id. 
Where “the use is in fact adverse and appears to be so, that is all that is required” 
to demonstrate adverse use. Richins v. Struhs, 412 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1966).  
Here, Janice gave Torres permission to use the road “not as permanent 
access to Parcel A,” but “to take prospective purchasers to the property for 
marketing purposes.” [R.310-11.] While the Harrisons concede that Janice gave 
Torres permission only “for the use specified,” they nonetheless assert that the 
Harrisons’ general use of the road was permissive while Janice owned the parcel. 
[Op. Br. at 43.] But the “use specified” was for Torres to “take prospective 
purchasers to the property for marketing purposes,” a use that ended as soon as 
Torres sold his parcel to the Hollands. [R.310-11.] 
The Harrisons assert that “[t]he Hollands made no showing whatsoever of 
a point in time at which their permitted use of a limited temporary access road 
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became adverse, as required by governing case law.” [Op Br. at 43.] But the 
Hollands’ use of the road for permanent access to their parcel is a use Janice 
never intended or permitted. [R.310-11.] The Hollands’ use was adverse from the 
day they acquired title on August 9, 1996. 
After closing on August 9, 1996, the Hollands used the road to pull a four-
horse trailer to their parcel and set up camp. [R.197,226,1370.] The Hollands 
continued using the road “all the time from then on,” including driving the road 
with a Jeep, a Lincoln, trucks, campers, and trailers. [R.197-99,203,226,363,368, 
1370.] They also maintained the road by adding gravel and water berms, as if 
they had a right to continue using it. [R.199.] Indeed, the Hollands thought they 
had a right to use the road. The realtor who took them to the parcel showed them 
a plat map with the road penciled in, and they understood from Torres that their 
parcel cost more than other parcels because of the road. [R.195,197.]  
Janice knew when the Hollands purchased the parcel and was aware that 
they were using the road. [R.197-98.] It would have been obvious to Janice from 
August 9, 1996, onward that the Hollands were using the road for a purpose she 
had not authorized. Janice could have ended the Hollands’ use, but never did. 
Neither did the Harrisons once they purchased the property until expiration of 
the 20-year period. The Hollands’ use was inconsistent with Janice’s permission 
from the beginning and therefore was both “adverse” and “appeared to be 
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[adverse],” which satisfies the test for adverse use for a prescriptive easement. 
Richins, 412 P.2d at 316.  
The trial court correctly ruled that the Hollands’ use was adverse.  
2. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury  
The Harrisons also challenge the jury’s determination of the scope of the 
easement based upon the wording of a jury instruction. The challenged 
instruction, Instruction No. 27, states: 
You should determine what is reasonably necessary, 
from the facts and circumstances of this case, for SPAH 
and the Hollands to access their property, taking into 
account the historic use and shape of the road during its 
20 years of use. You may express your decision in terms 
of the survey, or by determining the width of the 
easement. 
[R.1085; Op. Br. at 47.] On appeal, the Harrisons take issue with the “reasonably 
necessary” language in the instruction. [Op. Br. at 47-48.] But the Harrisons did 
not preserve this issue, and even if they had, the instruction is correct.   
2.1 The Harrisons did not preserve their objection to the jury 
instruction  
Before addressing the merits, the Hollands show that the jury instruction 
issue is not preserved and is inadequately briefed. 
As background, after the parties submitted proposed instructions and 
objections, the court crafted Instruction No. 27. During a colloquy between the 
court and counsel discussing the instruction, the Harrisons’ counsel reported that 
he was “[l]argely happy” with Instruction No. 27. [R.1749; Add.D.] Counsel 
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asked to have a sentence added to the instruction,4 but counsel did not otherwise 
object to the instruction. [R.1749-51.]  
But counsel did not just fail to object. When the trial court explained the 
instruction properly asked the jury to “tak[e] into account the historic use and 
shape of the road during its 20 years of use,” the Harrisons counsel agreed that “it 
covers the substance of it,” although counsel again requested the additional 
sentence. [R.1750.] Indeed, in objecting to a different proposed jury instruction 
(which was not given at trial), the Harrisons endorsed the “reasonably 
necessary” language by asserting that the proposed instruction “disregards 
recent law concerning the limitation of prescriptive easements to that reasonably 
necessary for historic use.” [R.1041 (emphasis added).] 
Because the Harrisons did not preserve their objection to the jury 
instruction, and indeed invited any error, this court should decline to address the 
issue on appeal. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ¶ 10, 40 P.3d 1119. 
In addition, this court should decline to address the argument because the 
Harrisons do not attempt to demonstrate that the “reasonably necessary” 
language is inconsistent with Utah law. Instead, the Harrisons assert that the 
language does not appear in Utah case law. But this is incorrect.  
                                              
4 Counsel requested that the court add the sentence, “The general rule is that 
the extent of a prescriptive easement is measured and limited by its historic use 
during the prescriptive period.” [R.1749.] 
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In Judd v. Bowen, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that “the ‘purpose for 
which the easement was acquired’ limits both the extent of the easement right 
granted as well as the physical boundaries of the easement itself.” 2017 UT App 
56, ¶ 58, 397 P.3d 686 (quoting Whitesides v. Green, 44 P. 1032, 1033 (Utah 1896)). 
The court then used the language included in the instruction here: the scope of 
an easement is a “‘question of reasonable necessity.’” Id. (quoting Big Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946)). “And what is 
reasonably necessary to effectuate the prescriptive right ‘must be determined 
from a consideration of the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case.’” Id. 
(quoting Whitesides, 44 P. at 1033). 
The trial court’s language does stem from Utah case law. And that case law 
has been endorsed by this court, albeit indirectly. The Harrisons fail to recognize 
this because they misunderstand Judd. The Harrisons claim that, in Judd, “the 
court of appeals reversed the trial court’s finding and order as they related to the 
widths of the claimants’ prescriptive rights, holding that ‘these orders were 
inconsistent with the usage that forms the basis of the Judd’s prescriptive right—
using the Driveway for ingress and egress purposes.’” [Op. Br. at 46-47.] 
But the court of appeals’ decision did not concern the width of the 
prescriptive easement. Its decision concerned the trial court’s order that the 
landowner remove a walkway and decorative border. Id. ¶ 64. The court of 
appeals held that “[t]hese orders are inconsistent with the usage that forms the 
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basis of the Judds’ prescriptive right—using the Driveway for ingress and egress 
purposes” because “neither the walkway nor the decorative border impedes the 
Judds from using the Driveway for access purposes.” Id. ¶ 65. The court of 
appeals went on to “vacate the [trial] court’s orders that the Bowens remove the 
decorative rock border and the walkway as those orders do not appear to be 
reasonably necessary to the Judds’ enjoyment of their access easement.” Id. ¶ 69.  
This court granted certiorari in Judd v. Bowen on the questions of “whether 
the court of appeals erred in its construction and application of the elements of 
the legal standard for establishing a prescriptive easement for access” and 
“whether the court of appeals erred in its ruling concerning the scope of the 
easement.” Judd v. Bowen, 2018 UT 47, ¶ 8, 428 P.3d 1032. This court subsequently 
dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted because “the court of appeals’ 
decision is not in conflict with any prior court of appeals decision or any decision 
of this court”; the court “relied upon well-established case law from both this 
court and the court of appeals”; its “decision did not alter or amend the 
standard”; and the court’s “application of these principles was in conformity 
with Utah Supreme Court and court of appeals caselaw.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 12-13. 
“Nothing the court of appeals did was unusual.” Id. ¶ 13. 
The trial court correctly relied upon the language in Judd. Regardless, the 
Harrisons have not explained how the language is inconsistent with Utah law, let 
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alone how Judd was wrongly decided. This court should decline to address the 
issue as unpreserved and inadequately briefed.  
2.2 The jury instruction was correct  
Instruction No. 27 is also correct. All parties agree that the scope of the 
easement is determined by historic use. And the jury instruction reflects the fact 
that the scope of the easement here was determined by its historic use.   
Indeed, the Harrisons never explain the difference between Instruction 
No. 27 and the instruction they prefer. Instruction No. 27 defines the width of the 
easement as the width reasonably necessary to continue the historic use. The 
instruction the Harrisons prefer defines the width of the easement by the historic 
use. The Harrisons’ argument is that the trial court erred in failing to use 
different words that mean the same thing.  
Without explanation, the Harrisons complain that the instruction told the 
jury to disregard the evidence in support of the Harrisons’ favored outcome. 
[Op. Br. at 47-48.] But the instruction told the jury to “determine what is 
reasonably necessary . . . for SPAH and the Hollands to access their property.” 
[R.1085.] And the instruction told the jury to base that determination on “the 
facts and circumstances of the case . . . taking into account the historic use and 
shape of the road during its 20 years of use.” [R.1085.] Accordingly, in addition 
to failing to show that the reasonably necessary standard is unsupported by Utah 
law, the Harrisons have also failed to show any legal error in the instruction.  
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The Harrisons also appear to misunderstand the facts of the case. The 
Harrisons state that “it was established . . . that, 20 years before this action 
started, the road across the Harrison parcel was a single blade, or 8 feet, in 
width.” [Op. Br. at 47.] But the evidence established that, while the width of the 
dozer blade used to cut the road was eight feet, it takes “several cuts to get the 
road in.” [R.1659-60.] The evidence also established that prior to the Hollands’ 
beginning their use, a power pole had been placed on the Hollands’ parcel, and 
placement of the pole would have required large power trucks to traverse the 
road to reach the site. [R.1592-97.] 
In any event, the relevant question is not the width of the actual road, but 
the Hollands’ historic use. The Hollands’ “historic use” of the road was their use 
“during the prescriptive period,” which was from 1996 to 2016. Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). Their historic use was using the road to 
access their parcel with their large vehicles, including the Jeep, truck, tent trailer, 
horse trailer, and fifth-wheel trailer, as well as the cement trucks, dump trucks, 
and bobtail trucks used to develop their property. [R.1527-28,1534,1545-46,1559, 
1568.]  
The Harrisons also wrongly assert that “[n]o competent evidence of any 
sort was offered of [the road’s] original course.” [Op. Br. at 47.] But again, the 
relevant question is the Hollands’ historic use during the prescriptive period. 
Ms. Holland testified that they had used the road on the Harrisons’ parcel to 
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access their parcel from August 9, 1996 to the present, and that the road shown in 
post-2013 satellite images was “the road that has existed since we first went to 
the property.” [R.1526-27,1530.] Mr. Blake surveyed the course of that road. 
[R.1576.] The Harrisons did not present evidence to contradict Ms. Holland’s 
testimony or demonstrate that the course ever changed.  
The Harrisons’ argument is not preserved, fails to demonstrate an error, 
and mischaracterizes the record. And even if there were an error, the Harrisons 
have not carried their burden to show prejudice. This court should affirm. 
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing Testimony 
from the Hollands’ Expert  
The Hollands’ expert (Mr. Blake) surveyed the road in 2016 and testified as 
to his survey. The Harrisons assert that his testimony should have been excluded 
as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under rule 403, as well as unreliable under 
rule 702(b). [Op. Br. at 51-55.] The Harrisons are incorrect.  
3.1 Mr. Blake’s testimony was relevant and not unduly prejudicial 
The Harrisons argue that Mr. Blake’s testimony was irrelevant because 
“the location of the road in 2016 is of no consequence in determining the scope of 
a prescriptive right.” [Op. Br. at 53-54.] But evidence is relevant if “it has any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable” and “the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.” Utah R. Evid. 401. The rules of evidence “establish a 
very low bar that deems even evidence with the slightest probative value 
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relevant and presumptively admissible.” State v. Richardson, 2013 UT 50, ¶ 24, 308 
P.3d 526 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Mr. Blake’s survey was relevant evidence. As the court said in denying the 
Harrisons’ motion in limine, “It is plain that the purpose of the survey is to 
provide the court with the legal description of a pathway on the ground in the 
event that the evidence establishes that there is a legal right of way along that 
pathway.” [R.839.]  
Ms. Holland testified that they had used the road on the Harrisons’ parcel 
to access their parcel from August 9, 1996 to the present, and that the road shown 
in post-2013 satellite images was “the road that has existed since we first went to 
the property.” [R.1526-1530.] Mr. Blake’s survey in 2016 therefore reflects the 
road as it existed during the prescriptive period. [R.1576.] While witnesses 
differed regarding whether the road had been widened before or during the 
prescriptive period, and if so, how much or what portions of the road had been 
widened, the jury was entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses. The 
survey was relevant to the jury given their credibility determinations. The court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony about the survey. 
Mr. Blake’s relevant testimony also was not unduly prejudicial. The 
Harrisons claim that Mr. Blake’s testimony should have been excluded as unduly 
prejudicial because the jury received “testimony regarding the location of the 
easement’s supposed historic centerline, which they clearly took as gospel.” [Op. 
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Br. at 54.] But Mr. Blake never purported to testify to a “historic centerline.” His 
testimony was limited to describing the process by which he surveyed the road 
in 2016, estimated the edges of the dirt road, created a legal description, and 
worked backwards from the description to estimate a centerline. [R.1577-79.] He 
informed the jury that he had not looked at historical photographs of the road, 
had not seen the road in the past, and did not “have any information at all on 
where that road went or how big it was in 1996.” [R.1583-84.] 
 Mr. Blake’s testimony was relevant and not prejudicial.  
3.2 Mr. Blake’s testimony was reliable  
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mr. Blake to 
testify as an expert. Under rule 702(b), the principles and methods underlying 
Mr. Blake’s testimony were reliable, based on sufficient facts or data, and were 
reliably applied to the facts. The Harrisons have not shown otherwise. To the 
contrary, they effectively concede all three prongs are met under 702(b).  
Rule 702(b) provides that expert testimony is admissible if “the principles 
or methods that are underlying in the testimony (1) are reliable, (2) are based 
upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.” 
Utah R. Evid. 702(b). The Harrisons acknowledge that they “did not challenge 
Mr. Blake’s credentials as a land surveyor; nor did they contend that his survey 
methodology was flawed or incorrectly performed.” [Op. Br. at 52.] Thus, the 
“principles and methods” underlying Mr. Blake’s testimony are “reliable” and 
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“based upon sufficient facts or data,” and therefore satisfy the first two prongs 
under 702(b). [Op. Br. at 52.]  
The Harrisons suggest that Mr. Blake’s principles and methods have not 
been reliably applied to the facts of the case. [Op. Br. at 52.] They argue that for 
purposes of a prescriptive easement, Mr. Blake measured “the wrong thing” by 
measuring the road as it existed in 2016. [Op. Br. at 52-53.] They claim he 
improperly calculated the centerline of the “easement” and failed to establish 
“the historic, 20-year long use of the easement.” [Op. Br. at 53.]  
But the Harrisons misunderstand Mr. Blake’s testimony. Mr. Blake did not 
survey the “easement.” Mr. Blake surveyed the road. He testified that he 
“surveyed the road that [sic] - - - way that goes through the Harrison property.” 
[R.1576.] And he described to the jury the process of measuring and surveying 
the road that was physically present on the parcel when he visited. [R.1576-59.] 
The Harrisons concede that Mr. Blake correctly and accurately performed this 
survey. [Op. Br. at 52.] It was for the jury to weigh Mr. Blake’s testimony 
regarding the survey of the road, along with all the other trial testimony, in 
determining the scope of the easement. 
Mr. Blake’s “principles and methods” were “reliably applied to the facts” 
because his survey of the road was accurate, as the Harrisons concede. [Op. Br. at 
52.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mr. Blake’s testimony. 
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4. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Excluding Testimony 
from the Harrisons’ Expert 
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony 
from the Harrisons’ expert (Mr. Bunker). This court “grant[s] a trial court broad 
discretion to admit or exclude evidence” and will “not reverse a trial court’s 
ruling on evidence unless the ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability.” 
Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, ¶ 43, 221 P.3d 205 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Mr. Bunker’s proffered testimony was not rebuttal testimony. “Rebuttal 
evidence is evidence tending to refute, modify, explain, or otherwise minimize or 
nullify the effect of the opponent’s evidence.” Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338 
(Utah 1993). Mr. Bunker sought to testify that “Mr. Blake’s survey was not based 
on historic use of the easement claimed by Defendants, but was formulated by 
(1) measuring the edges of the road across the Plaintiff’s property as it existed in 
October 2016, and (2) establishing a centerline of that road by ‘eyeballing a mid-
point line.” [Op. Br. Add 3 at 1-2.] But Mr. Blake testified to these facts and never 
represented anything to the contrary. [R.1576-79,1584.] Because Mr. Bunker’s 
proffered testimony would have “wast[ed] time” and “needlessly present[ed] 
cumulative evidence,” the court’s ruling excluding it was not beyond the limits 
of reasonability. Utah R. Evid. 403; Ferguson, 2009 UT 49, ¶ 43. 
For the same reason, the Harrisons have not shown prejudice. As 
Mr. Bunker’s proffered testimony merely repeated facts already testified to by 
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Mr. Blake, his testimony was “sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the case.” Armed Forces Ins. 
Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ¶ 22, 70 P.3d 35 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Utah R. Civ. P. 61.  
Finally, the Harrisons do not challenge the trial court’s ruling that 
Mr. Bunker’s testimony would usurp the court’s responsibility in instructing the 
jury. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 2.] ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2013 UT 
24, ¶ 16, 309 P.3d 201. Mr. Bunker’s expert designation stated that Mr. Bunker 
would testify “to the procedure for determining the location of a prescriptive 
easement.” [R.664.] Unlike the physical existence of the road, the doctrine of 
prescriptive easement is a matter of property law, and the procedure for 
determining the location or scope of a prescriptive easement is a legal question. 
See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998).  
The Utah Rules of Evidence do not permit a witness to “give legal 
conclusions,” which create “a danger that a juror may turn to the expert rather 
than the judge for guidance on the applicable law.” Steffensen v. Smith’s Mgmt. 
Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347-48 (Utah 1993). For that reason, the court of appeals 
has noted that experts should not be permitted to “tie their opinions to the 
requirements of Utah law.” Colosimo v. Gateway Cmty. Church, 2016 UT App 195, 
¶ 33, 382 P.3d 667 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff’d, 2018 UT 
26, 424 P.3d 866. The Harrisons have failed to demonstrate that Mr. Bunker’s 
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testimony would not have usurped the court’s responsibility in instructing the 
jury. [Op. Br. Add. 3 at 2.]  
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mr. Bunker’s 
testimony, and the Harrisons have not shown any prejudice. 
Conclusion 
The Harrisons have not demonstrated that the trial court erred in its partial 
summary judgment ruling, instruction of the jury, or evidentiary rulings. This 
court should affirm the lower court’s rulings.  
DATED this 17th day of April, 2019. 
ZIMMERMAN BOOHER 
/s/ Freyja R. Johnson  
Troy L. Booher 
Freyja R. Johnson 
Attorneys for Appellees SPAH Family 
Ltd., Stan E. Holland, and Page Holland 
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SPAH FAMILY, LTD; STAN E. HOLLAND; 







ORDER CONTINUING PRETRIAL 
CONFERENCE, DENYING 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND 




Civil No. 160700035 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
 
Based on the stipulation and joint motion of the parties, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1.  That the pretrial scheduling conference in the above-entitled matter currently set for 9 
a.m. on October 24, 2017, be and hereby is continued to November 14,  2017, at 9:00 am.  
2.  That Plaintiffs’ pending Motion to Reconsider Order of Summary Judgment 
(Defendants’ Claim of Easement by Prescription), is hereby denied, and Plaintiffs’ Motion to 
Exclude Defendants’ Expert Witnesses, will be heard on November 14, 2017, at 9:00 am. 
1 
1392450.1 
The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: October 23, 2017 /s/ LYLE R ANDERSON
02:33:31 PM District Court Judge
October 23, 2017 02:33 PM 1 of 2
000646
 
END OF ORDER 
Effective when digitally executed by the Court, above 
2 
1392450.1 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLIE W. 'HARRISON and TRENA 
HARRISON, 
Plainli ffs, 
J)ECLARATION OF .JANICE KIRK 
GUSTAFSON 
vs. 
SPAH FAMILY, LTD; STAN E. HOLLAND; 
and PAIGE HOLLAND, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF ARIZONA ) 
) ss. 
COlJNTY 01' lvtARICOPA ) 
Civil No. 160700035 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
1, JANICE KIRK GUSTAFSON, hereby declare as follows: 
1. I am an individual over the age of 21 years and am competent to testil)1 as lo the 
mailers set out herein. 
2. I was at one time the owner of all prnperty located within what is now known as 
Willow Basin Subdivision in Grand County, State of Utah, which I held and owned in the name 














3. I authorized the preparation by Keogh Land Surveying of a subdivision plat of 
Willow Basin Subdivision in November of 1994. 
4. As illustrated by Keogh Land Surveying, the subdivision consisted of eight lots, 
each accessible by roads drawn within the subdivision, all as reflected on the subdivision plat 
attached to this Declaration as Exhibit 1. 
5. It was at all times my intention that the lots within the subdivision be accessed by 
the roads shown on the plat map. 
6. After Willow Basin Subdivision was approved by necessary government agencies, 
I retained Randy Day and Raymond Tibbetts of Canyon County Realty to list and market the lots 
therein. 
7. I thereafter entered into an agreement with Manuel and Ginger Torres under 
which I conveyed my right, title and interest in and to Parcel A of the subdivision to the Torreses 
in exchange for Manuel Torres' construction of a cabin for me on Parcel G, a title which I 
retained. 
8. I became aware that, at some time before or after the summer of 1996 ( during 
which I was in Moab and would have known of its creation had it been during that time), Manuel 
Torres arranged for the grading of a narrow road connecting Parcel A with adjacent roads by 
means of a road looping over Parcel H (a title to which I had retained). 
9. It was my understanding that the purpose of the road crossing Parcel H was not as 
pennanent access to Parcel A, but as a means of permitting Manuel and Ginger Torres to talce 




10. While I neither knew of nor authorized the creation of the road in advance, its use 
thereafter for the purpose stated at paragraph 9 was pursuant to permission from me. 
I declare under the perjury laws of the State of Utah and the United States of America 
that the foregoing is true and correct. 













                   IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, MOAB
               GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
                          -o0o- 
CHARLIE W. HARRISON and     )
TRENA HARRISON,             )
                            ) 
               Plaintiffs,  )     Case No. 160700035
                            )
     vs.                    )        JURY TRIAL
                            )
SPAH FAMILY LTD, STAN E.    )       (Volume Two)
HOLLAND and PAIGE HOLLAND,  )
                            )
               Defendants.  ) 
                          -o0o-
          BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th day of May, 2018,
commencing at the hour of 8:09 a.m., the above-entitled matter
came on for further hearing before the HONORABLE LYLE R.
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1 Rogers?  You're--you're comfortable with the say it is?
2           MS. ROGERS:  It's fine.
3           THE COURT:  Okay.  
4           MS. ROGERS:  It's fine.
5           THE COURT:  And--but you still want me to do
6 something to No. 27?
7           MS. ROGERS:  No.
8           THE COURT:  Okay. 
9           MS. ROGERS:  Just leave it like it is.
10           MR. RAMPTON:  Could I speak to No. 27, your Honor?
11           THE COURT:  Yes. 
12           MR. RAMPTON:  Largely happy.  I would ask that the
13 second paragraph commence with the standard stated in the case
14 law of the general rules to the extent of a prescriptive
15 easement is measured and limited by its historical use during
16 the prescriptive period.  That's from Valcarce vs. Fitzgerald,
17 that's from the Judd decision that's kind of the black letter
18 standard in this area and I'd like to be able to argue it.
19           THE COURT:  I'm sorry.  What do you want me to add?
20 What are the words you want me to add?
21           MR. RAMPTON:  The general rule is that the extent of
22 a prescriptive easement is measured and limited by its
23 historic use during the prescriptive period.  (Inaudible)
24           THE COURT:  Well, I thought I got that with taking
25 in the third paragraph, taking into account the historic use
001749





1 and shape of the roadway during its 20 years of use. 
2           MR. RAMPTON:  I understand that and it--it--I agree
3 it covers the substance of it but I think the jury ought to
4 hear the legal standard that they're operating under, because
5 I'd like to be able to read that, too, and--and argue it. 
6           THE COURT:  Well, sorry.  And there are--there are
7 lots of words and lots of opinions over the years and I--I
8 don't think I can give them every one of those words.  So I've
9 done the best I could to--to cull from each opinion that you
10 presented to me and maybe--
11           MS. ROGERS:  I am going to object to that because I
12 don't think that it is the only legal standard.  And we go
13 back to this Lent vs. Lance case--
14           THE COURT:  Which is why I also say you should
15 determine what is reasonably necessary from the facts and
16 circumstances of this case for Spah and Hollands to access
17 their property. 
18           MS. ROGERS:  Right.  
19           THE COURT:  I'm--I'm giving this jury two--two
20 different things that the Courts of Appeals have said in this
21 state in different cases and letting them run with it.  Now,
22 maybe what I could do is I could say, this is it, this is what
23 you're supposed to do, you're supposed to--I could--Mr.
24 Rampton would be thrilled if I would say you must determine
25 what is the smallest width of the roadway that they--that they
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1 used during the entire 20-year period.  That's it.  That's the
2 roadway.
3           Or I could say what you want me to say, which is you
4 should determine what is the largest width that they need in
5 order to be able to do whatever they have ever done and what
6 are they likely to need to do in the future. 
7           MS. ROGERS:  Well I just don't want one or the other
8 to be more emphasized.  And I think you--
9           THE COURT:  I've given them both in the same
10 sentence.
11           MS. ROGERS:  --I think you--
12           THE COURT:  To determine what is reasonably
13 necessary from the facts and circumstances of this case, which
14 I get from one opinion for the Spahs and Hollands to access
15 their property and then from another case, taking into account
16 the historic use and shape of the roadway during its 20 years
17 of use.
18           MS. ROGERS:  But now, Mr. Rampton wants more.
19           THE COURT:  And I'm not going to give it to him.
20           MS. ROGERS:  Okay.  If you don't give him more then
21 you don't have to give us more.
22           THE COURT:  Okay.  28--
23           MS. ROGERS:  Good things you had a million kids to
24 settle disputes amongst; right?
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§ 5:16. Continuous and uninterrupted use—Uninterrupted use
References
West's Key Number Digest
• West's Key Number Digest, Easements 7
The landowner may interrupt an adverse usage by asserting ownership before the prescriptive period has expired. 1
Actions by a third person do not interrupt an adverse usage because they do not represent an assertion of dominion by
the owner. 2  Moreover, brief interruptions caused by natural forces or construction projects do not negate continuity
of usage. 3
In jurisdictions adhering to the adverse use theory of prescription, 4  there must be an actual physical interference with
the claimant's use. 5  The landowner must erect physical obstacles or otherwise use the servient parcel in such a way as
to prevent, at least temporarily, the adverse use. 6  It is not sufficient merely to attempt an interruption 7  or to render
the use less convenient. 8  The obstruction must in fact interfere with the claimant's usage. 9  Thus, the erection of gates
during the prescriptive period is immaterial where they do not prevent a claimant from using a road. 10  Moreover,
use of land by the owner for the same purpose as the claimant does not constitute an interruption. 11  A number of
jurisdictions, however, have taken the position that action by the servient owner, such as erecting physical barriers,
amounts to sufficient interruption even if such action ultimately failed to halt the adverse use. 12
The prevailing view is that a mere protest by the owner, whether oral or written, will not interrupt an adverse usage. 13
Indeed, complaints may strengthen the conclusion that the claimant's use was hostile. 14
There is also authority that a belated grant of permission by the owner after the adverse use has commenced does not
affect the running of the prescriptive period. 15  It is arguable, however, that such a grant of permission undercuts the
adverse character of a claimant's usage. 16  This is certainly the case if the adverse claimant accepts the landowner's
permission to use the servient property. 17  Similarly, it has been held that an express agreement giving permission to
§ 5:16.Continuous and uninterrupted use—Uninterrupted use, The Law of Easements &...
 © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
use a driveway interrupted adverse usage. 18  Clearly, permission granted after the prescriptive period has expired has
no legal effect. 19
Several jurisdictions have enacted statutes that enable a landowner to give persons using the owner's land written notice
of an intention to dispute any claim arising from such use. 20  This notice constitutes an interruption, preventing the
acquisition of any prescriptive right. 21  Upon receiving such a notice, the claimant may bring an action against the
landowner for disturbing the claimant's right to use the land. 22  Legislation of this character is an appropriate solution
to the landowner's dilemma in obtaining protection against prescriptive easements. 23  It avoids both the potential for
violent confrontation and the uncertainty implicit in the requirement of actual interruption 24  as well as the expense of
instituting a lawsuit. Of course, a statutory notice of interruption filed after the prescriptive period has run cannot divest
the claimant of a prescriptive easement. 25
In addition to actually obstructing adverse usage or giving notice pursuant to a statutory scheme, a landowner may
interrupt the use by instituting successful legal proceedings. The filing of an action by a landowner against whom the
statute of limitations is running will interrupt the prescriptive period if the lawsuit results in a judgment that the use
was improper. 26  Such judgment relates back to the start of the proceedings, and it is irrelevant that no cessation of use
actually occurs. 27  A dismissed or abandoned action, however, does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. 28
Similarly, the finding of a petition to register title to a parcel of land interrupts the riping of a claimed prescriptive
easement. 29
The conveyance of the servient estate does not interrupt the prescriptive period. 30  A subsequent owner takes the land
subject to the ripening easement. 31
Westlaw. © 2019 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
Footnotes
1 Stiefel v. Lindemann, 33 Conn. App. 799, 811, 638 A.2d 642, 649 (1994) ("The owner of the servient
estate over which the right-of-way is used may interrupt the use by committing an act that breaks its
continuity."); O'Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590, 617, 703 S.E.2d 561, 588 (2010) (quoting this treatise).
The servient owner must interrupt the adverse use during the prescriptive period. Westpac Aspen
Investments, LLC v. Residences at Little Nell Development, LLC, 284 P.3d 131, 136 (Colo. App.
2011), cert. denied, 2012 WL 3292842 (Colo. 2012) (prescriptive footpath easement established before
alleged interruption); Smith v. Chamblin Properties, LLC, 201 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D.
2006) (actions to block access to parking lot did not occur until prescriptive period had passed); Fyfe
v. Tabor Turnpost, L.L.C., 22 Neb. App. 711, 720, 860 N.W.2d 415, 424–425 (2015) (interruption of
water through irrigation lateral took place after prescriptive period had passed); Kessinger v. Sharpe,
71 A.D.3d 1377, 898 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382-383 (4th Dep't 2010) (fence blocking use of driveway erected
after prescriptive period had run); Rotenberger v. Burghduff, 2007 SD 19, 729 N.W.2d 175, 180 (S.D.
2007) (interruption of trail usage after prescriptive period had passed was ineffective). See §§ 5:17 to
5:22 (defining prescriptive period).
2 Shuggars v. Brake, 248 Md. 38, 46, 234 A.2d 752, 758 (1967) (placing posts across driveway by person
other than servient owner did not constitute interruption); Tuf Flight Industries, Inc. v. Harris, 129
S.W.3d 486, 489 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2004); O'Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590, 617, 703 S.E.2d 561,
588 (2010) (quoting this treatise). See 4 Tiffany, Law of Real Property (3d ed.) § 1205.
3 Jordan v. Bailey, 113 Nev. 1038, 1047, 944 P.2d 828, 834 (1997); O'Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590,
617, 703 S.E.2d 561, 588 (2010) (quoting this treatise).
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4 See § 5:1 (differentiating between lost grant and adverse use theories of prescription).
5 Jesurum v. WBTSCC Limited Partnership, 169 N.H. 469, 151 A.3d 949, 959 (2016); Margoline v.
Holefelder, 420 Pa. 544, 546, 218 A.2d 227, 228 (1966) ("In order for the continuity of adverse use to
be interrupted, the obstruction must be in fact an interruption and must be accomplished with that
intent."); see also Wehde v. Regional Transp. Authority, 237 Ill. App. 3d 664, 680, 178 Ill. Dec. 190, 604
N.E.2d 446, 458 (2d Dist. 1992). For subsequent history, see Wehde v. Regional Transp. Authority,
284 Ill. App. 3d 297, 220 Ill. Dec. 26, 672 N.E.2d 843 (2d Dist. 1996). See generally What will disprove
acquiescence by owner essential to easement by prescription in case of known use, 5 A.L.R. 1325,
1328–1330.
6 Kelley v. Westover, 56 Ark. App. 56, 58–60, 938 S.W.2d 235, 235–237 (1997) (landowner protested
verbally and engaged in a series of overt acts, such as placing barbed wire across road, to interrupt
adverse usage); Serrano v. Grissom, 213 Cal. App. 2d 300, 305–306, 28 Cal. Rptr. 579, 582 (5th Dist.
1963) (servient owner plowed up road and farmed land); Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 550-552
(Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (landowner interrupted adverse use of driveway by construction of large earthen
berm which prevented use for three days); Stiefel v. Lindemann, 33 Conn. App. 799, 811, 638 A.2d
642, 649–650 (1994) (servient owner interrupted adverse use by installing fence across right-of-way and
planting shrubbery); Denardo v. Stanton, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 358, 365, 906 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2009),
review denied, 454 Mass. 1108, 910 N.E.2d 909 (2009) (landowner placed boulders across road which
blocked vehicle access but not foot traffic, and such action was insufficient to prevent acquisition of
prescriptive easement for pedestrian travel on road); Biddix v. McConnell, 911 So. 2d 468, 477-478
(Miss. 2005) (landowners interrupted adverse use by removal of boundary stakes); Ray v. Nansel,
2002 MT 191, 311 Mont. 135, 144, 53 P.3d 870, 876 (2002) (landowner interrupted adverse use of
wastewater ditch by blocking ditch); Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County Taxpayers Ass'n v.
State ex rel. Rhodes, 329 N.C. 37, 49-54, 404 S.E.2d 677, 686–687 (1991); Pittman v. Lowther, 363 S.C.
47, 52, 610 S.E.2d 479, 481 (2005) ("We conclude actions are sufficient to interrupt the prescriptive
period when the servient landowner engages in overt acts, such as erecting physical barriers, which
cause a discontinuance of the dominant landowner's use of the land, no matter how brief."); Schilling
v. Backer, 2004 SD 45, 678 N.W.2d 802, 803 (S.D. 2004) (landowner interrupted adverse use of road
by erecting fence); Ormiston v. Boast, 68 Wash. 2d 548, 551, 413 P.2d 969, 971 (1966) (landowner
interrupted adverse use by placing fence across road). See also Rice v. Miller, 306 Minn. 523, 525–526,
238 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1976) (finding continuity broken when landowner erected barriers across beach
access road for several months each year and engaged in other acts asserting dominion that effectively
halted vehicular traffic, although not stopping pedestrians entirely); Weir v. Gibbs, 46 A.D.3d 1192,
1194, 849 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (3d Dep't 2007) (landowner erected successive obstacles to impede vehicular
and pedestrian traffic on roadway); Bouton v. Williams, 42 A.D.3d 795, 795–796, 839 N.Y.S.2d 350,
351–352 (3d Dep't 2007) (noting that “a substantial physical barrier that successfully interrupts use
for any period of time stops the running of the prescriptive period”).
7 Frech v. Piontkowski, 296 Conn. 43, 58, 994 A.2d 84, 94 (2010) (intermittent attempts by landowner
to prevent recreational use of reservoir and posting “No Trespassing” signs which claimants removed
were not sufficient to interrupt continuous use); Margoline v. Holefelder, 420 Pa. 544, 546, 218 A.2d
227, 228 (1966) (blockade of driveway for two days did not constitute actual interruption when there
was no evidence of attempted use).
8 Brown v. Ware, 129 Ariz. 249, 251 n.2, 630 P.2d 545, 547 n.2 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1981) (stringing barbed
wire across a roadway deemed insufficient to interrupt usage when barrier was knocked down one day
later); South Norwalk Lodge, No. 709, Benev. & Protective Order of Elks, Inc. v. Palco Hats, Inc.,
140 Conn. 370, 374, 100 A.2d 735, 737 (1953) (claimant repeatedly removed barriers from right-of-
way and continued use); King v. Corsini, 32 Ill. App. 3d 461, 466, 335 N.E.2d 561, 565 (3d Dist. 1975)
(acts by landowner blocking road for short periods did not interrupt public use); Posnick v. Herd, 241
A.D.2d 783, 784–785, 660 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (3d Dep't 1997) (temporary parking of vehicles across
right-of-way did not effectively interfere with claimant's use).
9 Jesurum v. WBTSCC Limited Partnership, 169 N.H. 469, 481, 151 A.3d 949, 959 (2016) (finding no
evidence that landowner interrupted adverse use of parking area); Concerned Citizens of Brunswick
County Taxpayers Ass'n v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 329 N.C. 37, 54, 404 S.E.2d 677, 687 (1991); Reed v.
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Piedimonte, 138 A.D.2d 937, 937, 526 N.Y.S.2d 273, 274 (4th Dep't 1988) (no evidence that erection
of temporary barriers "ever effectively interfered with, or disturbed, plaintiff's continuous use of the
driveway").
10 Wilkins v. Nieberger, 303 Ky. 662, 666, 198 S.W.2d 986, 989 (1947) (erection of gates across passway
"in itself is not inconsistent with the acquiring of an easement"); Brown v. Redfern, 541 S.W.2d
725, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Keefer v. Jones, 467 Pa. 544, 548, 359 A.2d 735, 738 (1976). There
is authority, however, that the installation of locked gates during the prescriptive period by the
landowner interrupts adverse use. Amerimont, Inc. v. Gannett, 278 Mont. 314, 324, 924 P.2d 1326,
1333 (1996) (erection of locked gate by landowner interrupted claim of adverse use because claimant
requested key to continue usage); Garrett v. Mueller, 144 Or. App. 330, 337–340, 927 P.2d 612, 616–
618 (1996) (finding that erection of locked gate was sufficient to interrupt adverse use of roadway, and
expressing concern that requiring physical action to halt adverse usage would invite breaches of peace).
11 Elmer v. Rodgers, 106 N.H. 512, 515, 214 A.2d 750, 752 (1965); see also Wehde v. Regional Transp.
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12 Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 550-552 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (declaring that "a barrier established
for the purpose of, and in fact, interrupting an adverse claimant's use is effective even if it is ultimately
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and posting “No Trespassing” signs constituted interruption of prescriptive period even if efforts were
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denied, 547 U.S. 1111, 126 S. Ct. 1913, 164 L. Ed. 2d 664 (2006) (discussing Conn. Stat. § 47-38, and
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prescriptive easement); Crandall v. Gould, 244 Conn. 583, 593–596, 711 A.2d 682, 687–688 (1998)
(discussing Conn. Stat. § 47-38, and finding that injunction against claimant should have same effect
as statutory notice scheme and preclude acquisition of prescriptive easement); Dowley v. Morency,
1999 ME 137, 737 A.2d 1061, 1069–1070 (Me. 1999) (discussing statutory method for preventing
acquisition of prescriptive easement); see also South Norwalk Lodge, No. 709, Benev. & Protective
Order of Elks, Inc. v. Palco Hats, Inc., 140 Conn. 370, 374, 100 A.2d 735, 737 (1953) (landowner's
failure to utilize statutory notice to prevent prescriptive right noted as factor in establishing easement);
Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d 606, 607 (Me. 1989) (landowner served notice to halt acquisition of
prescriptive easement to use sewer pipe); O'Connell v. Larkin, 532 A.2d 1039, 1041 n.2 (Me. 1987)
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Rhode Island adheres to the position that a landowner can halt the prescriptive period from running
by affirmatively communicating objections to the adverse use. Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc.,
112 A.3d 703, 710 (R.I. 2015) (landowner's continuous objections to adverse use of property defeated
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Laws § 34-7-7.
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